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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS ADDRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, PROPER APPELLATE PROCEDURES FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONNEL POLICY 
AND PROCEDURE MANUALS IN THE CASE OF BERUBE V. FASHION 
CENTRE, LTD., 771 P.2d 1033 (UTAH 19Q9), WHICH SHOULD BE 
CONTROLLING IN THIS APPEAL, 
In the case of Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd./ 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989), the Supreme Court addressed many significant 
issues; three issues pertain to the case |at hand: statutory 
construction, appellate review of summary judgment, and the 
impact of a policy and procedure manual. The Berube Case, 
supra, involved a private employee instead of a public employee; 
nevertheless, the principals are pertinent hereto. 
In the Berube decision at 77 P.2d 103^ 5 this Court stated: 
The rulings of a trial court regarding statutory 
construction are not entitled to particular deference. 
Betenson v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc.f 645 P.2d 
684, 685-86 (Utah 1982). In analyzing Section 
34-37-16, we are guided by the riile that in the absence 
of an ambiguity, a statute should be construed 
according to its plain language. See Johnson v. State 
Retirement Officef 755 P.2d 161 [sic]; State v. 
Archulettay 526 P.2d 911 (Utah 1974). Although 
legislative intent is important, see Osuala v. Aetna 
Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980), the 
best indication of legislative irjtent is the statutes 
plain language. Jensen v. Interiflountain Health Carey 
Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). 
In light of this guidance by the Supreme Court, it is obvious 
that the Court of Appeals and the District Court should have 
reviewed the statutes pertaining to Appellant in a manner 
consistent not only with the stated legislative intent but also 
with the statute's plain language. Therefpre, in regards to the 
statutory rights of appeal of Appellant an<fi also the violation 
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of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, this Court should 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals* 
The Berube Case, at 77 P.2d 1039, also addresses the 
appellate requirements to review a summary judgment. 
In reviewing a summary judgment, we liberally construe 
all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in 
favor of the party opposing the motion. Payne ex rel, 
Payne v. Meyers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987); Oberhansly 
v. Sprouse, 751 P.2d 1155 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We are 
free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bankf 737 
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
The Court of Appeals erred by utilizing the Respondents' facts 
to review the Summary Judgment. 
The third issue which is of significance herein is the 
emphasis that the Berube Case, supra, placed upon the importance 
of a policy and procedure manual. The case makes it clear that 
an employer is expected to abide by the terms of a policy 
manual. Associate Chief Justice Howe's concurring opinion (with 
which Chief Justice Hall concurred) states at page 1050: 
I concur only in the results in parts IV and V deeming it 
not necessary or appropriate here to go beyond the written 
policy manual of the employer, which I view as being part of 
the total employment contract. 
At page 1052 Justice Zimmerman in his (concurring in the result) 
opinion stated: 
In this context, the representations made by the employer in 
employee manuals, bulletins, and the like are legitimate 
sources for determining the apparent intentions of the 
parties. 
In the case at hand, Richfield City had enacted the Richfield 
City Police Department Policies and Procedures Manual which 
specifically allowed for appeals of termination. Thus, this is 
further support for this Court to reverse the decision. 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS RELIED UPON THE FACTS SET FORTH 
BY THE RESPONDENTS IN ITS RULING AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS AND TOTALLY 
DISREGARDED THE STIPULATED FACTS WHICH WERE BINDING 
UPON BOTH THE PARTIES AND THE COURT. 
The Respondents, in support of their Motion For Summary 
Judgment submitted several affidavits. Of particular importance 
are facts from the affidavits of defendants Harwood and 
Farnsworth. In the Court Record at page 229 Harwood stated: 
All media representatives were asked if they wanted to be 
notified if open session resumed. All responded in words or 
to the effect that "We do not necessarily want to return but 
if action is taken, advise us what action the Council 
takes.,f 
In the Court Record at page 238 Farnsworth made the exact same 
statement. The above statement is extremely significant when 
compared with footnote one of the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Footnote one states: 
1. Prior to the closed session the Council asked if anyone 
present wanted to be notified if open session resumed. Most 
of those present were members of the media and they 
responded that they did not necessarily desire to return, 
but wanted to be advised if action was taken. 
It is obvious that footnote one was obtained by the Court of 
Appeals from the facts as set forth by the Respondents. 
However, controlling herein are the facts which were 
stipulated to by the parties in open court. Fact number four as 
set forth in the Appellant's Petition herein states as follows: 
4. Kent Colby, the representative of KSVC radio station, 
who was a member of the public present at the Council 
meeting when Richfield went into the closed meeting, 
requested that he be contacted so that he could be present 
if Richfield went back into open meeting to transact any 
further business (Record pages 48, 49). 
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Obviously, the stipulated facts are not only binding upon the 
parties but are binding upon the Court as well. Therefore, the 
decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it 
erred in reviewing the Summary Judgment. 
III. THE RICHFIELD CITY COUNCIL ENACTED THE RICHFIELD CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURE MANUAL, AND IT IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD; IT IS NOT A "PHANTOM" DOCUMENT. 
The Respondents have stated that the Richfield City Police 
Department Policies and Procedures Manual was not properly 
entered before the Trial Court. However, an evaluation of the 
Court Record establishes just the opposite. In the Appellant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Appellant specifically addressed the Richfield City Police 
Department Policies and Procedures Manual and attached as 
Exhibit D to that Memorandum are minutes of the January 8, 1981, 
Richfield City Council meeting in which the policies and 
procedures manual was both ratified and amended (Court Record, 
pages 315, 316 and 328 to 337). 
Appellant in his written request for an appeal of his 
termination made particular reference to "policies and procedure 
or State of Utah laws" (Record page 337). Thus, the policies 
and procedures manual was adequately placed into the record and 
is appropriately before this Court. Moreover, this Court can 
take judicial notice of the policies and procedures manual as it 
can any ordinance or resolution enacted by a public body. 
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The Supreme Court should reverse the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, The decision of the Court of Appeals is in 
opposition to many decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, and the 
Court of Appeals clearly erred in its review of the Summary 
Judgment. 
IV, THE RESPONSE BRIEF OF RICHFIELD RAISES FACTUAL ISSUES 
WHICH HAVE NO RELEVENCY OR MATERIALITY TO THE CASE AT HAND, 
In the Response Brief, Richfield raises the matter of the 
alleged threats of the officers in the police department to 
resign if Ward was not fired as chief of police. This matter is 
totally irrelevant to the case at hand. Ward has never argued 
that Richfield could not fire him as chief of police. Rather, 
Ward has consistently argued that Richfield must comply with the 
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act and that Richfield must comply 
with the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the District 
Court. Richfield is the only entity which must determine if it 
has satisfactory reasons to terminate any employee. However, 
once such a determination is made, Richfield must comply with 
the procedures and restraints placed upon it by the legislature 
and the judiciary. Therefore, the allegation that the entire 
Richfield City Police Department was going to resign, or any 
other such factual issue, is totally irrelevant and immaterial 
to the matter as hand. 
V. THE RESPONSE BRIEF OF RICHFIELD ATTEMPTS TO CHALLENGE 
THE VALIDITY OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED 
BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
If Richfield was dissatisfied with the decision of the 
District Court to make the temporary restraining order effective 
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to June 17, 1981, which included the June 8, 1981, meeting of 
the Richfield City Council, Richfield should have appealed the 
matter. The time for appeal has long passed and now Richfield 
must accept the decisions of the District Court in the same 
manner as anyone else must recognize the finality of the 
decisions* It is untimely and inappropriate for Richfield to 
raise these matters at this time. 
There is adequate judicial precedence as stated in the case 
of Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter Day Saints v. Wallace, 573 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1978) to 
uphold the District Court's issuance of the Temporary 
Restraining Order. At page 1287, the Utah Supreme Court stated, 
"...the trial judge has a wide discretion in the matter of 
requiring security, and if there is an absence of proof showing 
a likelihood of harm, certainly no bond is necessary." 
Therefore, the District Court had no obligation to require a 
security if there was no evidence that the temporary restraining 
order would cause harm. On the meeting for June 8, 1981, as 
indicated in the court record, the agenda provided for three 
activities that day and the Court merely prohibited Richfield 
from acting on one of the items on the agenda. 
Although there is precedence for Ward to establish the 
validity of the Temporary Restraining Order, including the 
challenge that no security was posted, it is unnecessary because 
the matter is now fin^l and firm; Richfield did not initiate an 
appeal in the appropriate time frame. Consequently, this is not 
a matter which is before this Court for consideration. 
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VI. THE RESPONSE BRIEF OF RICHFIELD SUGGESTS THAT THERE 
WAS SOMETHING INAPPROPRIATE IN THE BEHAVIOR OF WARD TO 
OBTAIN AN EX PARTE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; THIS 
IS TOTALLY INCORRECT AND UNTRUE, 
The record before the Court clearly shows that on the 
evening of Friday, June 5, 1981, Richfield caused the agenda of 
its emergency meeting to be distributed to both the Richfield 
Reaper, the newspaper published in the City of Richfield, and 
the local radio station. The newspaper publishes on a weekly 
basis and would not publish again until after the Richfield City 
Council meeting had been held on Monday, June 8, at 8:00 a.m.. 
The only notification of the meeting which Ward had was a radio 
broadcast which he listened to on Saturday afternoon, June, 6, 
1981. There was absolutely no opportunity to obtain a court 
hearing or involve any other parties except the Judge prior to 
the Monday, 8:00 a.m., special meeting. Consequently, Ward and 
his attorney met with the District Court judge, the Honorable 
Don V. Tibbs, on Sunday, June 7, 1981, to obtain the Temporary 
Restraining Order. The courthouse did not open until 8:30 a.m. 
on Monday, and, therefore, these matters had to be taken care of 
prior to the city council meeting on June 8, 1981, at 8:00 a.m. 
All ex parte contact with the District Court judge was done 
appropriately and the Temporary Restraining Order was served 
immediately upon the Richfield City Council and all of the 
defendants by the Sevier County Sheriff's Department prior to 
the 8:00 a.m. city council meeting. A hearing on the matter was 
set within the required ten day time period. There was no 
inappropriate behavior on the part of the District Court Judge 
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or on the part of Ward or his attorney in obtaining the 
Temporary Restraining Order. 
VII. RICHFIELD PLACES GREAT EMPHASIS UPON THE HUTCHISON 
CASE; HOWEVER, THAT CASE NEEDS TO BE DISTINGUISHED AND IS 
NOT RELEVANT TO THE CASE AT HAND. 
In the case of Hutchison v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772 (Utah 
1984), an employee of the Beaver County Sheriff's Department 
challenged his termination. There are two reasons why this case 
must be distinguished from the case at hand. In the first 
place, Hutchison was a county employee of the Beaver County 
Sherifffs Department. In the instant case, Ward was a municipal 
employee of Richfield City, a third class city. Municipalities 
and counties have different statutes pertaining to the hiring 
and firing of their employees. In the second place, the 
Hutchison Case, supra, was argued on common law concepts and not 
upon the statutes that pertained to the hiring and firing of 
county employees. Therefore, since the case at hand involves a 
municipal employee and also involves the statutes upon which 
municipal employees may be fired, the Hutchison Case, supra, has 
no relevancy to the case at hand. 
Moreover, Richfield places great emphasis upon the Utah 
Supreme Court decisions of State v. Stavarf 578 P.2d 847 (Utah 
1978) and Taylor v. Gunderson, 154 P.2d 653, 107 Utah 473 
(1944). This Court has specifically distinguished both these 
cases from this case in the original Ward v. Richfield City, 716 
P.2d 265 (Utah 1984). The Utah Supreme Court held that these 
cases were not pertinent to the case at hand with the following 
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statement at page 266, "None of these cases is helpful here." 
Therefore, not only did these cases arise before the 1977 
changes in the current municipal statutes, but also these 
matters have been overruled in the 1984 decision in the Ward 
case, supra.. 
VIII. IN THE RESPONSE BRIEF, RICHFIELD TAKES AN 
INCONSISTENT POSITION ARGUING THAT IN ONE INSTANCE WARD IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO A STATUTORY APPEAL BECAUSE HE IS A MEMBER OF THE 
RICHFIELD CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND ON THE OTHER HAND THAT HE 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE RICHFIELD CITY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL BECAUSE HE WAS 
HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT. 
Richfield argues that Ward is not entitled to a statutory 
appeal because he is a member of and the head of the Richfield 
City Police Department. It then argues that he is not entitled 
to an appeal pursuant to the policies and procedures manual 
because he is not a member of the department but is the head of 
the department. These positions are totally inconsistent with 
both the statutory language and the language of the policies and 
procedures manual. 
Ward may have contributed to the drafting of the policies 
and procedures manual; however, it was by the authority of the 
city council that any suggestions or input he made were enacted 
by resolution of the Richfield City Council. Therefore, Ward 
did not create the policies and procedures manual and was not 
the sole controller and arbitrater of the terms thereof. A 
higher power than Ward, the city council, enacted the policies 
and procedures manual. 
Consequently, Ward should be entitled to the appeal 
procedures of the policies and procedures manual as any other 
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police officer employed by the City of Richfield. It should not 
matter whether an officer is the chief of police or if he is the 
last officer hired to handle traffic duties, any police officer 
of Richfield is entitled to rely upon the policies and 
procedures manual and the appellate procedures for review of his 
termination. 
As is adequately outlined in the Appellant's Brief, 
Richfield City is not authorized to have a "department" as 
defined by the statutes pertaining to cities of the first and 
second class. Richfield is a third class city and as such it is 
authorized a marshall or chief of police and assistants. It 
does not have a police "department." If the arugment is correct 
as set forth by Richfield, Richfield having designated its 
police organization as a "department" would also be required to 
create a Civil Service Commision as is required of cities of the 
first and second class. Richfield would then have to monitor 
the Civil Service Commission to make sure that it properly 
managed the hiring, firing, and appeals of all police officers 
employed by Richfield City. Therefore, if Richfield had a Civil 
Service Commission, there would be no question that Ward would 
be entitled to a hearing pursuant to those statutes. However, 
Richfield is a third class city, and, as determined by this 
Court in the first Ward appeal, there is a distinction between 
cities of the first and second class and cities of the third 
class. As a third class city, Richfield does not have a 
"department" which requires a Civil Service Commission. It 
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functions with an Appeals Board and all appointed employees of 
the city, including police officers, are entitled to a hearing 
if they are terminated in their employment. 
Ward has consistently argued that he is entitled to a 
hearing both pursuant to statutes and pursuant to the policies 
and procedures manual. On the other hand, Richfield has 
consistently argued that he is not entitled to a hearing of any 
sort because in one instance he is a member of a department, and 
in the other instance he is head of a department and, therefore, 
not a member. This very inconsistent position should not be 
tolerated by this Court. The Court should rule that Ward is 
entitled to a hearing regarding his termination pursuant to the 
policies and procedures manual and pursuant to the statute. 
Therefore, Ward respectfully prays that this Court will 
overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals and rule in favor 
of Ward consistent with the important principals which have been 
brought to the attention of this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this T day of April, 1990. 
George &; Brown, Jjp< 
Attorney for Appellant 
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